Abstract: Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. This talk introduces MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by self-modifying code detection mechanisms. Unlike most traditional techniques, MCHammer does not require memory access or waiting periods, making it highly efficient. We compare MCHammer to the classical Flush+Reload technique, improving in terms of trace granularity, providing a powerful side-channel attack vector. Using MCHammer, we successfully recover keys from a deployed implementation of a cryptographic tool. Our findings highlight the practical implications of MCHammer and its potential impact on real-world systems.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.09864
Bio: Dr. Bill Brumley (TKK 2006, TKK 2009, Aalto 2012) is the Kevin O’Sullivan Endowed Professor at Rochester Institute of Technology’s Department of Cybersecurity. He is also the Director of Research for the ESL Global Cybersecurity Institute (GCI) at RIT. A native Texan, he received his doctorate from Aalto University (Helsinki, Finland) in 2012. He is a former Staff Engineer for Qualcomm’s Product Security Initiative (QPSI) in San Diego, California. He is a 2018 European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant Laureate. Before joining RIT in 2023, he spent a decade as a Professor at Tampere University (Finland). He specializes in system security, cryptography engineering, and side-channel analysis.
Date and Location:
Wednesday, March 04, 2026, 13 PM
Free entry until capacity is reached
Room 3 of ITEFI
